nginx-proxy-manager-mcp
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nginx-proxy-manager-mcp · Docs

Security

Which permissions nginx-proxy-manager-mcp needs, what the server may do and how to protect the endpoint.

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Default: read-only

Without further settings the server only exposes the 20 read-only tools. Claude can read hosts, certificates, access lists, users, settings and the audit log, but cannot change anything.

Give the NPM user View Only everywhere. Then read-only mode is protected twice: even if a write tool slipped through, NPM rejects the call.

Write mode

With MCP_READ_ONLY=false and Manage permissions, Claude can among other things:

  • create, change, disable and delete proxy hosts, redirects, streams and 404 hosts
  • request, renew and delete Let's Encrypt certificates
  • change access lists, i.e. decide who may access which service

Caution

Whoever controls this endpoint controls your reverse proxy. A wrong proxy host can expose services, a deleted access list protects nothing anymore. Narrow write mode down with MCP_TOOLS_DENY and let Claude ask before critical tools.

Tools carry MCP hints: readOnlyHint for read tools and destructiveHint for tools that overwrite or remove existing configuration (update_*, delete_*, disable_*). Claude uses them to ask before risky actions.

update_* only changes the fields that are sent. Exception: locations on proxy hosts and items and clients on access lists replace the existing entries completely.

Credentials

  • NPM only knows user logins. Use a dedicated user, never your admin.
  • Not an administrator: then the server can change neither users nor settings, even if the tools are active.
  • Email and password stay in the container. They are only sent to NPM_URL, never to Claude.
  • The NPM token is only kept in memory and never logged.

Protecting the endpoint

Anyone who can reach /mcp can call all active tools as the NPM user. Never leave the endpoint open on the internet.

Option Suitable for How
Access list in NPM Claude (web, desktop, mobile) Allow only Anthropic's IPs and your own network.
Bearer token (MCP_AUTH_TOKEN) Claude Code, own clients Set a long random value, e.g. openssl rand -hex 32.
Internal only Clients in the same network Publish no port, reachable only inside the Docker network.

The token comparison is constant-time. /healthz is intentionally unauthenticated and only returns {"status":"ok"}.

Tip

The NPM admin UI (port 81) does not need to be public for the MCP server. Inside the same Docker network the container name is enough.

Container

  • The server is stateless and writes nothing to disk. You can run it with read_only: true, cap_drop: ALL and no-new-privileges.
  • Requests to /mcp are limited to 4 MB.
  • Secrets belong in a .env file or a secret store, not in a compose.yaml committed to Git.