Contents of the docs
nginx-proxy-manager-mcp · Docs
Security
Which permissions nginx-proxy-manager-mcp needs, what the server may do and how to protect the endpoint.
Default: read-only
Without further settings the server only exposes the 20 read-only tools. Claude can read hosts, certificates, access lists, users, settings and the audit log, but cannot change anything.
Give the NPM user View Only everywhere. Then read-only mode is protected twice: even if a write tool slipped through, NPM rejects the call.
Write mode
With MCP_READ_ONLY=false and Manage permissions, Claude can among other things:
- create, change, disable and delete proxy hosts, redirects, streams and 404 hosts
- request, renew and delete Let's Encrypt certificates
- change access lists, i.e. decide who may access which service
Caution
Whoever controls this endpoint controls your reverse proxy. A wrong proxy host can expose services, a deleted access list protects nothing anymore. Narrow write mode down with MCP_TOOLS_DENY and let Claude ask before critical tools.
Tools carry MCP hints: readOnlyHint for read tools and destructiveHint for tools that overwrite or remove existing configuration (update_*, delete_*, disable_*). Claude uses them to ask before risky actions.
update_* only changes the fields that are sent. Exception: locations on proxy hosts and items and clients on access lists replace the existing entries completely.
Credentials
- NPM only knows user logins. Use a dedicated user, never your admin.
- Not an administrator: then the server can change neither users nor settings, even if the tools are active.
- Email and password stay in the container. They are only sent to
NPM_URL, never to Claude. - The NPM token is only kept in memory and never logged.
Protecting the endpoint
Anyone who can reach /mcp can call all active tools as the NPM user. Never leave the endpoint open on the internet.
| Option | Suitable for | How |
|---|---|---|
| Access list in NPM | Claude (web, desktop, mobile) | Allow only Anthropic's IPs and your own network. |
Bearer token (MCP_AUTH_TOKEN) |
Claude Code, own clients | Set a long random value, e.g. openssl rand -hex 32. |
| Internal only | Clients in the same network | Publish no port, reachable only inside the Docker network. |
The token comparison is constant-time. /healthz is intentionally unauthenticated and only returns {"status":"ok"}.
Tip
The NPM admin UI (port 81) does not need to be public for the MCP server. Inside the same Docker network the container name is enough.
Container
- The server is stateless and writes nothing to disk. You can run it with
read_only: true,cap_drop: ALLandno-new-privileges. - Requests to
/mcpare limited to 4 MB. - Secrets belong in a
.envfile or a secret store, not in acompose.yamlcommitted to Git.